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ABSTRACT
Sony seeded the ongoing conundrum of balancing protected
intellectual property rights with the potential of technologies that
enhance the use of intellectual content.' New technologies that enable
use also remove many copy limitations. Traditional remedies against
individual infringers served their purpose of compensation and
deterrence. These forms of action have been weakened where the
jurisdictional, monetary and administrative underpinnings of legal
administration are compromised. This complex of factors is further
exacerbated by the clash between conflicting ends of protecting
intellectual property rights while at the same time ensuring appropriate
public beneficial use. Most enabling technologies have the potential for
fundamental public benefit. The very power of these technologies
facilitates unlawful activity. The traditional function of law has been to
compensate those who have been injured by imposing liability on the
wrongdoer who, by intention or through a failure of duty or negligence,
occasions the harm. The unprecedented growth in value of intellectual
property rights have shifted the primary focus of "promot[ing] the
progress of science and [the] useful arts" to the protection of exclusive
rights for limited times as an end unto themselves.3 The use of
secondary liability doctrine to overcome diminished functionality of law
is appropriate when it is premised on actual infringement based on
demonstrable evidence of intent, inducement, and facilitating others to
infringe. Secondary liability, however, is compromised where it is used
to reduce the level of care required of the right holder, or permits the
right holder to externalize costs and risks of doing business. Recent
secondary liability cases have raised questions as to whether the judicial
process is being used as a means of enhancing market returns otherwise
unjustifiable.4 There have been occasions where direct evidence of
intent was not available and inferences were based on use of the
underlying technology.' The adoption of the patent law staple article of
commerce is inapposite to inferences from the use of technology for
copyright infringement. It diverted utilization and development of
common law tort doctrine and obscured the need for transparent means
1. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
2. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11t N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
4. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir.
2004); vacated by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
5. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affid in
part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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of technology readiness, utility and risk assessment in the determination
of present and potential uses of technology. Recent cases have not
bound themselves to the limitations of this doctrine and have adopted
transparent rules regarding intentional behavior and reasonable standards
of care recognizing the obligation of the right holder to remain vigilant
as well the technology provider to minimize infringement and maximize
the public good.6
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Sony Betamax 7 was a first in a growing line of technologies that
enabled the general population to access, view, copy, utilize, and
distribute copyrighted works.8 It was an awakening of the difficulties
enabling technologies posed for the protection of intellectual property by
legal action against direct infringers.9 Therein resides the quandary and
choice to bring the action against the provider of the technology based
on secondary liability. The issue was framed by the fact that the very
technology that threatened control over the content right provided an
enhancement of beneficial access and use consistent with the purpose of
intellectual property.1°  This represents the perennial dilemma of
balancing the means of privatization with the ends of benefit to society."
6. See Tiffany and Company v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 2008 WL 2755787
(S.D.N.Y.), 2008-1.
7. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
8. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419-20 (1984).
9. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
10. Sony, 464 U.S. at420.
11. While somewhat questionable, current value estimates have recently been reported as in
the trillions of dollars per year. One report states the "total value of intellectual property is
estimated at $5 Trillion a year in the United States, 45% of GDP." Estimated intellectual content
values were in the billions of dollars at the time of the introduction of the video recorder and are
well into the trillions of dollars by the end of the 20th Century. www.ikblaw.com/docs/733/
U.S._Intellectual PropertyLaw_Presentation_2008-02-06.ppt (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). Another
report from the Department of Justice task force noted that
[1]n 2002, American copyright industries accounted for an estimated 6% of the nation's
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). Their $626.6 billion contribution to the United States
economy exceeded the total GDP of such countries as Australia, Argentina, The
Netherlands, and Taiwan. Copyright industries employed 5.48 million workers, or 4%
of America's work force. Between 1997 and 2002, copyright industries added workers
at an annual rate of 1.33%, exceeding that of the national economy as a whole (1.05%)
by 27%. Copyright industries in the United States sold and exported an estimated
$89.26 billion in 2002 to foreign nations.
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In the two and a half decades since the decision in the Universal
City Studios action against Sony and the "Betamax" further
technological development spawned the digital revolution and
unprecedented changes in the forms and use of copyrightable
materials. 12  The rapid evolution of technology during this period
includes the maturation of the internet, the introduction of compression
technologies, the dazzling functionality of search engines, and
qualitative improvements in the essential function of intellectual
processes. Despite these advances and attempts to revisit the premises
and function of intellectual property, 13 a number of issues in the balance
between private rights and public interests in emerging technologies
remain unresolved. Sony left us with doctrine and dicta that obscured
the need for rigorous methods of evaluation and assessment of new
technologies that ensure reasonable standards and transparency. 4
Nascent technologies do not always reflect their potential use or value.
15
One's view of them often becomes mired in limitations of the present
and attempts to perpetuate the status quo.' 6  The task of protecting
Statistics on the aggregate value of intellectual property confirm the breadth of trade and jobs
relative to the copyright industries. Report of the Department of Justice's Task Force on Intellectual
Property (Oct. 2004) http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/IPTaskForceReport.pdf.
12. See A&M Records, Inc., 114 F.Supp. 2d 896; Aimster, 334 F.3d 643; Grokster, 545 U.S.
913.
13. This paper once started with a focus on "fear" of losing intellectual property values based
on the postulation that intellectual property played a role in recovery of the nation from the 20th
Century depression. Whether this is correct or not, "fear of the unknown" does play a role in policy
and decision making. It is difficult for those whose lives began well after the Depression to realize
the lasting anguish and the hope for a better future. It was once said in this context that "the only
thing we have to fear is fear itself." Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), First Inaugural Address 1933,
available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html. The full quotation was: "[T]he only thing
we have to fear is fear itself-nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed
efforts to convert retreat into advance." It is appropriate at this time to recognize his proclamation
represented the wisdom of a president whose vision recognized the limitations imposed on a nation
that had lost a significant part of its capital and manufacturing preeminence to other industrialized
nations. The United States had been reduced to a nation whose industrial production diminished to
approximately ten percent of the world's industrial output. It was a time of reduced liquidity,
reduced credit, and limited capital growth. The investment cost of a revitalized industrial
infrastructure was prohibitive. FDR's vision was that the most significant asset of the American
people was ingenuity, creativity, and resourcefulness. FDR's plan simply focused on maximizing
the potential of growth and value of intellectual property rights. The plan required relatively
minimal capital investment to achieve the goals of employment and opportunity in the revitalization
of the nation's economic recovery. Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in
American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139 (2008).
14. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
15. James Lardner, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF




existing property interests and lack of assessment paradigms directly
affects acceptance of new technologies.
1 7
The purpose of this article is to identify a few of the issues in the
evolving function and implications of secondary liability in balancing
the multiple intellectual property interests affected by enabling
technologies. That balance must be tempered by restraint when
evaluating technologies that enhance public beneficial use and diminish
the protective measures necessary for intellectual property rights.
There are subtle distinctions applicable to direct and secondary
liability, and differences within secondary liability constructs of actual
or vicarious based on behavior, coupled with intent and inferences of
intent to be presumed from third party use of technology. The issues
before the courts in the 2 1st century present even further changing
perspectives and mature paradigms. The changes have been
incremental, yet fundamental, and through their constant reference to
Sony, are best understood in that context.
18
17. James Lardner's observations reflect the struggle of competing technologies and
technologies that affect existing property rights:
Technological history is a constant struggle between pioneers and protectionists -
between those who are trying to introduce new devices and those who are trying to guard
and exploit existing ones. With every technology there arises a community of interest,
which sooner or later finds itself threatened by some other technology. . . It takes
continued devotion to iron out the bugs in that technology, to teach people how to live
with it, and to spread its benefits to points remote from the scene of discovery ...
[Plioneering depends on protection.
Id. at 10. This book is out of print, although there are numerous authorized reprintings, often under
altered titles such as Mentor publication 1968 substituting "AND THE VCR WARS" at the end, or
FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED (Paperback) (2002).
18. The papers presented and published in this issue have but one thing in common; on the
surface they appear to be the same topic. In fact, each represents a unique perspective and they
blend a sum greater than the parts. Jay Dratler, Jr., Palsgraf, Principles of Tort Law, and the
Persistent Need for Common-Law Judgment in IP Infringement Cases, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP.
J. 23 (2009); Thomas C. Folsom, Towards Non-Neutral Principles of Private Law: Designing
Secondary Liability Rules for New Technological Uses, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 43 (2009); Mark
Bartholomew, Contributory Infringers and Good Samaritans, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (2009);
Liam O'Melinn, Making Others do the Work: Secondary Liability as a Departure from the
Traditional Contours of Copyright, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 171 (2009); Ira S. Nathenson,
Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA's Safety Dance, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 121 (2009);
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Secondary Liability and the Fragmentation of Digital Copyright Law, 3
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 105 (2009); Connie Davis Powell, The Saga Continues: Secondary
Liability for Copyright Infringement: Theory, Practice and Predictions, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J.
189 (2009).
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II. THE SONY LEGACY: A MYSTICAL MIX OF ISSUES AND CHOICES
A. Setting the Stage for Sony
Sony Betamax is "legendary" in the annals of copyright
infringement actions.' 9 Subsequent actions have addressed many of the
direct liability issues before the court, but have not fully accounted for
the reasoning behind application of the fair use defense.2 ° Contributory
liability standards involving intentional inducement and behavior have
been refined by the decisions of the court in Napster, Aimster, and
Grokster.21 Yet, there remains mysticism about the case and its
resolution that is akin to a light fog in the early dawn. Nagging, and
likely of little relevance, is the question why, when there was a finding
of non-infringement, the court continued their analysis of secondary
liability, particularly since when almost every decision says there can be
no secondary liability without infringement.22
19. The case and surrounding factors have been reviewed, analyzed, augmented by
generations of jurists, scholars, and the public. The work of journalists such as James Lardner,
supra note 17 provides context for the position of Universal City Studios and other content right
holders. The ontogeny of the decision making process as revealed in the publication of the papers
of the retired justices as methodically analyzed by Professor Jessica Litman gives unusual insight
into the judicial process, see generally, infra 22. See also, Peter S. Minell & David Nimmer,
Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REv. 941 (2007); Peter S. Minell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism In
Action: Indirect Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework And Sony's De Facto Demise,
55 UCLA L. REv. 143 (2007); Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster
Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs,
50 ARIz L REv 577 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity Of Sony v. Universal: The
Intellectual Property Legacy Of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1831 (2005); Jessica Litman,
The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 917(2005). An early scholarly work by Professor A.
Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47 (1989), sets an early stage for contemporary analysis.
20. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th
Cir. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
21. Id.
22. There are anecdotal tidbits of wisdom applicable to understanding the elements of conflict
resolution. This becomes apparent when simple questions are asked as to the needs and goals of the
parties. Some of these inhere with the public interest presence in judicial processes. Decisions
often evidence resolution of conflicting pragmatic and philosophical penchants of the justices. We
are reminded of the need to understand the perspective of each of the participants in the process of
final resolution by Professor Litman, these factors can be appreciated in the resolution of the
disparate interests of the parties and the justices themselves.
It's worth taking some time to examine the historical materials that have become
available in the 21 years since the Sony decision, to see what persuaded the Court to
resolve the case the way it did. The Supreme Court files of Justice William Brennan,
Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry Blackmun (who wrote the first draft of a
majority opinion and ended up turning it into a dissent) are available for review in the
[3:223
THE SONYLEGACY
Universal City Studio and other content right holders needed
protection for their vast stores of copyright materials.23 The ability to
control copying is the sine qua non of the copyright.24 The introduction
of technology that reduces this control by enabling unauthorized copying
presents a significant judicial dilemma.25 If the number of infringers
exceeds the practical ability of the right holder and the courts to
effectively exercise control, judicial relief is an impaired remedy.26 An
action to enjoin the use of the technology, or hold the purveyor of the
technology secondarily liable for damages, represented an obvious and
"reasonable" choice of action.
Sony understood the value of the underlying technology of video
recording devices. They used their experience to transfer the technology
of their professional recorders to serve as consumer recording devices. 27
Current technology transfer paradigms likely replicate Sony's internal
understanding of their technology. They include market and
manufacturing readiness assessments and consider risk assessment
involving potential legal issues, including infringement. Whether Sony
assessed these issues systematically, or not, it is clear that Sony
understood copyright rules and the potential liability users of the
Betamax might have if they record protected materials. This was
evidenced by both their behavior and the included warning to this effect
in their advertising and user manual. 28 They also anticipated action by
the studios to block the manufacture, import and use of the Betamax by
political or judicial action.29 While they may have anticipated legal
action against individual parties that used the device for copying
Library of Congress, and they provide some insight into the Court's deliberations.
Litman, supra note 19, at 920.
23. "Plaintiffs allege that they will suffer great monetary damage if this infringement is
allowed to continue." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.Supp. 429, 432
(D.C. Cal 1979).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (West 2009).
25. John 0. Hayward, Grokster Unplugged. It's Time to Legalize P2P File Sharing, 12
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 1 (Fall 2007).
26. Reis, Paper Presented: "Technology Enablement: Normative Behavior and Rules of Law,"
Annual Meeting Law and Society, 2005 (on file with author); see also, Mark Bartholomew,
Contributory Infringers and Good Samaritans, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (2009).
27. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
28. Universal City Studios, 480 F.Supp. at 436 (The court noting that
The Betamax operating instructions, . . . include a warning about possible copyright
infringement. On page 17 of the instruction booklet, the following language appears:
'Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted.
Unauthorized recording of such material may be contrary to the provisions of the United
States copyright laws.' Id.)
29. Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,422-24.
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broadcast materials, it is unclear that they anticipated an action against
them for contributory liability based on either their intent, or solely on
their manufacture or distribution of the Betamax.30  It is even less likely
that they expected an action against them based on inference derived
simply from the use of the device for infringing purposes or a balance
between permissible and infringing uses.
The public perspective applied to intellectual property rights cases
focuses on the public benefit from copyright and the quid pro quo of
privatization.3' The question is one of balance and a reasonable
relationship between the means (privatization) and the end (progress in
the sciences and useful arts).32 These rights are subject to provisions
addressing "fair use. 33 They are likewise subject to the exercise of
discretion in the judicial process to ensure that remedies secure both
rights granted and the interests of the intended public beneficiaries. The
wisdom of balance is required to keep both property rights and public
benefit in proper perspective. The issues are not only between the
parties, but the beneficiary without standing before the court.34
30. Defendants contend that home copying for home use is not an infringement and, even if it
were, defendants could not be held responsible under any theory of infringement or vicarious
liability. Id. at 436-37.
31. See, e.g. Universal Studios, Inc., v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D.C. Cal.
1979) (stating that:
The resolution of these issues first requires a determination of whether Congress gave authors
monopoly power over this use and, if so, whether the corporate defendants are in any
way liable. As will be discussed, these determinations are not easily made. Protection of
the public interest requires balancing the need for wide availability of audiovisual works
against the need for monetary reward to authors to assure production of these works. Id.)
32. Id.
33. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2009). [This is] Interesting, but fair use has an impact on the
market construct. Does secondary liability play a role in this since the impact on the market can be
altered by the business model selection of the content right holder. In the Sony case could this have
been restructured in their charges to the broadcaster to take into account loses, if any, that would
have been occasioned by copying. See an early article presenting this thought in the context of
News Broadcasts. This may raise a question of market failure as the market seems to work through
compensation for the initial broadcast. See, e.g., David H. Kramer, Who Can Use Yesterday's
News? Video Monitoring and the Fair Use Doctrine, 81 GEO. L.J. 2345, 2346-47, (July, 1993).
Compare to other licensing arrangements and the new DRM issues with iTunes. Apple's new
business model takes into account the potential for file sharing and prices their product accordingly
for DRM-protected and files with DRM removed. They also price new and older releases on a
sliding scale. Brad Stone, Want to Copy iTunes Music? Go Ahead, Apple Says, APPLE DROPS
ANTICOPYING MEASURES IN ITUNES, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/01/07/technology/companies
07apple.html?em (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
34. Robert Reis, The Public Beneficial Interest in the Intellectual Commons, The Implications
of the Public Trust Doctrine and Necessary Standing to Represent the Public Interest, 6th Annual




B. Infringement - The Foundation of Secondary Liability
In order to establish liability the copyright holder must first prove
ownership of a valid copyright and then infringement by the defendant.35
The parties to the action tell yet another tale. In addition to Sony,
Universal sued one individual and several retail establishments that sold
and demonstrated the Betamax.36 Justice Stevens makes the point that
the action was not brought to seek relief from individuals that may have
infringed.37
The question whether the broadcast materials were copyrighted, or
whether they were copied without the permission of the right holder was
not an issue before the court.38 Unauthorized copying constitutes
infringement.39 The exclusive rights granted the copyright holder are set
forth in section 106 and provide that they are held subject to the
provisions of section 107 which codified the common law rules of "fair
use."40 The Sony Court cites and appears to accept the findings of the
district court which found that the effect of copying on the potential
market was minimal; the offered proof of harm from time shifting was
speculative, that this was not copying for commercial purposes and
preventing copying of these broadcasts would "inhibit access to ideas
without any countervailing benefit."4 On the basis of these factors and
the balance required under the "equitable rule of reason" the court
upheld the district court's finding of fair use.42
35. "[T]he sine qua non of contributory infringement is direct infringement just as the
commission of a tort by one person is the sine qua non for imposing liability on another person for
contributing to the commission of that tort." Oddi, supra note 19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 875 (1979)). See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013, for the proposition that "[a]s a threshold matter, before
we examine Perfect 10's claims that Google is secondarily liable, Perfect 10 must establish that
there has been direct infringement by third parties." Id. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013, n2
("Secondary liability for copyright infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement
by a third party." Id.).
36. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422 (1984) (The
individual was Mr. William Griffiths. "Griffiths is a client of plaintiffs' law firm and consented to
being a defendant in the lawsuit. Plaintiffs have waived any claim for damages or costs against
Griffiths for his activities alleged in the complaint. Plaintiffs never expected Griffiths to be
represented by counsel and he has not been." Id)
37. Sony, 464 U.S. at 419 (stating, "Respondents sought no relief against any Betamax
consumer. Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable accounting of profits from
petitioners, as well as an injunction against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's." Id)
38. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (West 2009).
40. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2009).
41. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450-56 (1984).
42. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
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At this point, the question becomes, what was meant when the court
indicated that "copyright holders who license their works for broadcast
on free television would not object to having their broadcasts time-
shifted by private viewers?" 43  Why wouldn't they object if they
perceived a problem? Or, why would they object if they were
compensated for broadcast rights by the television stations? In current
contexts, this question may be applied to a resolution of the respective
duties of the content holder and those sought to be held secondarily
liable in balancing the respective duties of the parties. In either instance,
why is this pursued as an infringement issue rather than a failure of the
right holder resulting in a market malfunction based on incorrectly
setting broadcast pricing with the station? If the content right holder
correctly prices the broadcast license, it would account for copying
undertaken for personal use. If so, is this really a "fair use" or "permitted
use" issue, or an issue affecting the duty of the right holder under
secondary liability constructs, or does it matter?44  Professor Wendy
Gordon aptly noted:
The legal system acts in diverse ways to increase the
probability that these and other conditions for perfect
competition will be present . . .When the market does not
work perfectly, a decision will often have to be made on
whether market transactions or collective fiat is most likely to
bring us closer to the .. .result the 'perfect' market would
reach.45
If the quintessential element of secondary liability is infringement, then
a finding of fair use means the critical element of infringement necessary
to support secondary liability is missing.46 We can only speculate why a
43. Id.
44. See generally Kramer, supra note 333, at 2345.
45. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L REv. 1600, 1608-09 (1982). Market failures
continue to be an issue in other contexts. See the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in eBay v.
Mercexchange regarding the threat of injunction as a means of altering market-based negotiations.
eBay v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396-97, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006). In a larger context, the
concurring opinion noted: "the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an
injunction may not serve the public interest." Id. Consider the actions brought by Perfect 10 v.
Google (Amazon.com, Inc.), 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) and Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d 788
(9th Cir. 2007). It certainly looks like a new business model to supplement the sales of their
magazine. CfField v. Google, 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (where defendant deliberately did not opt out of
Google's search engine indexing web contents and then sued for infringement for damages).
46. Gordon, supra note 45, at 1613-14.
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finding of fair use didn't end the case in Sony47 as it has in later cases.48
Is the rest history as the Court engaged in an extended analysis of
contributory and vicarious liability, based both on intentional behavior
and inferences that might be drawn using the patent law "Staple Articles
of Commerce" analogy? Is this dictum? Is this out of context with the
tradition of the Court not to engage in rule making beyond the case
before it? Is this indicative of the reconciliation of differences among
the Justices with all sides receiving something to peg their positions on?
Why did the court continue with what appears to be a Staple Articles of
Commerce commentary and note that: "[t]he Betamax is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses. Sony's sale of such equipment to the
general public does not constitute contributory infringement of
respondent's copyrights? ' 49 Some of this speculation that the reason lies
in the internal compromises of the court is evidenced in the records of
the justices and the need to appease residual concerns of right holders
and industry. 50 In any event, the analogy to the Staple Article of
Commerce provision in the Patent Act was unfortunate and inapposite to
copyright and may be a factor that retarded the development of
technology readiness assessments and other analytical processes that
hold the promise of objectivity and transparency in the evaluation of use
and intent inferences in new technologies.
1. The Many Faces of Secondary Liability
Secondary liability has been subdivided to include both
contributory liability and vicarious liability.5 Contributory liability has
been further divided into at least two more parts. First, liability is
premised on intentional behavior inducing and facilitating
infringement.52 Second, liability is premised on inferences derived from
the actual use of the technology when no intention or behavior is
evident.53 Secondary liability based on inference is a part of the Patent
Act "Staple Article of Commerce" equation which presented two
problems in application.54 First, there were no objective standards for
47. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Clues to these questions may be enlightened by a careful reading of
the deliberations of the Justices recounted in Professor Litman's article. Litman, supra note 19.
48. See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
49. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
50. Litman, supra note 19, at 928-944.
51. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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what constituted a Staple Article of Commerce that would prevent an
inference of intent to result in infringement by the end user.55 Second,
there were implications that if the article were a Staple Article of
Commerce, it would be a safe harbor for "any" infringement that later
occurred, whether intentional or not.56  While the doctrine does not
appear to have been applied in but one case after Sony until addressed in
Grokster, it is raised here to help understand the implications this
anomaly might have had in retarding the development of technology
assessment paradigms.
57
2. Contributory Liability: Intentional Inducement
The Sony Court noted a series of factors indicating what they
believed would constitute intentional behavior, such as the business
model, advertising, and refusal to utilize protections against
infringement, performing, or enabling essential elements in the link to
infringement.58 The rationale for liability is that one should be held
liable for the ordinary consequences of one's acts. As a separate basis of
its decision, the District Court also indicated that Sony was not liable as
a contributory infringer even if they found that the use of the Betamax
constituted an infringing use, thus establishing the proposition that mere
use of the technology would not render Sony liable without direct
involvement or inducement of the infringement.59 Refuting the notion of
intent to induce infringement, the court noted the warning placed by
Sony in its instruction booklet on copyrights and infringement:
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be
copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such material may be contrary
to the provisions of the United States copyright laws." 6
Likewise, the Court observed Sony's awareness of the copyright
issues and the potential that some users might record copyrighted works
did not taint a product that could be used for lawful purposes: "The
55. Id
56. Id.
57. See Peter S. Menell, Indirect Copyright Liability: A Re-examination of Sony's Staple
Article of Commerce Doctrine, BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAW & TECH. 10 (Law & Tech. Scholarship
Paper No. 6, Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/gi/viewcontent.cgi?article =
1007&context-bclt. See also, Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability For Copyright Infringement:
Bittorrent As A Vehicle For Establishing A New Copyright Definition For Staple Articles of
Commerce, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (Fall 2006).
58. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448.




District Court assumed that Sony had constructive knowledge of the
probability that the Betamax machine would be used to record
copyrighted programs, but found that Sony merely sold a "product
capable of a variety of uses, some of them allegedly infringing.",6 1
The warning and Sony's disclosure of their market plan to
Universal City, coupled with a request for permission to market the
device may have been taken as evidence of "good faith" in the secondary
liability analysis which influenced the later finding of "fair use. 62
3. Contributory Liability: Active Inducement and Inference from
Infringing Uses
C. Active Inducement
As Justice Stevens noted at the outset of the majority opinion:
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable
for infringement committed by another. In contrast, the
Patent Act expressly brands anyone who 'actively induces
infringement of a patent' as an infringer, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
other than a knowledge that it could absent any indication of
intent that it be used.63
Rather than apply common law tort rules, the Court recognized that
Congress addressed secondary liability in the Patent Act.64 The analogy
of patent law to copyright ameliorated concerns of congressional
countenance of secondary liability based on "active inducement" or
intent coupled with behavior. 5 Justice Stevens further observed:
The absence of such express language in the copyright statute
does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright
infringements on certain parties who have not themselves
engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability is
imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of
contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader
61. Id.
62. Id. at 456. It is interesting to see good faith cited as an express factor. See generally,
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007).
63. "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Sony,
464 U.S. at 434-35.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (West 2009); Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35.
65. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442,448-50.
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problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to
hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.66
As a practical matter, this should be a non-issue since the creation of a
right presumes a remedy unless otherwise limited by Congress.67 After
Sony, the courts appear to seamlessly mix common law tort doctrine
with citation to provisions under the Patent Act.68
D. Inference. "A Staple Article of Commerce"
Perhaps the more enduring legacy of Sony has been the function of
inference in secondary liability, when it comes into play and what
problems have been created outside of patent applications by its use.69
The inference in tort law served the purpose of holding one responsible
70for the ordinary and necessary consequences of their actions.
In the context of secondary liability with enabling technologies, the
question implicitly raised by the district court was whether liability can
be premised simply on the fact of infringing use, or whether the provider
of the enabling technology could be held liable knowing it could be used
to infringe absent any overt indication of intent to distribute, market or
induce it to be used for wrongful purpose.71 Section 107 (b), previously
noted, uses the term "actively induces infringement" as the basis for
liability.
72
Section 107 (c) addresses the use of:
... a component of a patented ... process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
66. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984). See
generally, Litman, supra note 19. It would appear this is the basis of digital age liability as indicated
in Napster, Aimster, and Grokster. Consider the application of "active" inducement in the remand
and trial of Streamcast. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 454 F.Supp.2d 966
(C.D. Cal. 2006).
67. See generally eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (West 2009). See generally, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416
F.Supp.2d 828 (2006) and the case on remand to the district court, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
2008 WL 4217837 (C.D.Cal. 2008). See also Oddi, supra note 19.
69. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 488-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Sony Corp. of Am. v. United City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 426 (1984).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2009).
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commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.73
This section specifically provides for "knowing" the use will be to
infringe the patent right.74 It also identifies the infringement as applying
to the use of a component of the patented invention the use of which has
no other purpose than the protected use to which it is put under the
patent.75 The inference regarding intent to infringe appears to be directly
related to the use of the protected component of the patent interest.76 To
permit use of the operative element outside of the patent would destroy
the patent right itself.77  The objective of the provision addressing
"Staple Article of Commerce" was to ensure that the patent right did not
exclude other lawful uses of a non-infringing element of the patent, not
to create an inference of intent to infringe.78 Nor was it intended to
create a safe harbor for "knowing" infringement.79 In the relatively
circumspect context of patent infringement, the claims identify the
component or element, the use of which can be only to infringe, if not a
Staple Article of Commerce. 80  This section does not appear consistent
with the use of enabling technologies as a means of infringing copyright
interests. The inclusion of this rule in Sony serves more as a clichd than
a guide in resolving issues of secondary liability.
81
Another residual of this ambiguity occurs when an attempt is made
to address an enabling technology, not a "component," and apply a test
of whether it meets designation as "a Staple Article of Commerce




76. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 441.
77. Janice M. Mueller, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 315 (Aspen Publishers) (2nd ed.
2006).
78. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 ("[A] sale of an article which though adapted to an infringing
use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a contributory
infringer." Id).
79. See id. at 491-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 107(c) (West 2009).
81. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440-41 (1984). This
being said, the treatment of Perfect 10 v. Visa of the use and function of credit cards may be
considered somewhat of an analogy to representing an element of the transaction which was treated
as a Staple Article of Commerce. In fact, Google argued in Perfect 10 v. Google, that its search
engine was a Staple Article of Commerce, despite the implications of search use as a means to
identify the location of infringing full size images. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007). Tiffany v. eBay stands on a different set of propositions: eBay
functions as (no pun intended) a "Staple Article (Method) of Commerce."
82. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
20091
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
patent right to the functionality of technology used for copyright
infringement is somewhat inapposite. The examples used in Sony are as
follows: "Selling a staple article of commerce e.g., a typewriter, a
recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine technically contributes to
any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of
'contribution,' if deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial
management.,
83
Are any of the above examples or analogies similar to those
addressed in the Patent Act? If these were applied by the court to
copyright, the result as thus inapposite, would be imperfect when it
comes to treating the technology or enabling product itself as
constituting the element in "Staple Articles of Commerce. 84
E. What is a Staple Article of Commerce? Objective Standards and
Technology Assessment
There are few standards set forth for determination of what
constitutes a Staple Article of Commerce.85 How is a Staple Article of
Commerce identified? What constitutes non-infringing use? Is there a
qualitative evaluation or a quantitative measure? What time frame is
necessary for the measurement of function? And, can the determination
change over time depending on the uses being made when reviewed?
These are but a few of the questions left open.86 These and innumerable
sub issues arise as a basis for criticism of the Staple Article of
Commerce "doctrine," the use of which may also have been a factor that
inhibited technology transfer and other assessment models from being
adopted for evaluative purposes. Technology transfer assessments
measure user demand, as well as market, manufacturing, and risk
87assessments. Technology assessments can identify early users based
on user driven needs and later users based on potential adoption of the
technology to fulfill needs at a future date.88 What today might be
misunderstood as infringing, because of early adoption, may well be
83. Id. at 426.
84. This may explain in part why Justice Blackmun verbalized the need for inferences from
the ordinary consequences of one's actions under general tort law. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,487 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. See generally supra note 19.
86. Id.
87. See generally, Phyllis L. Speser, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
(John Wiley & Sons) (2006).
88. Id. at 105.
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tomorrow's potential for future public benefit, designated a Staple
Article of Commerce.89
Without the transparency of objective standards, the Staple Articles
of Commerce analysis appears to be a rationalization for decisions
without standards for risk assessment. This creates fears of uncertain
futures for innovators of new technologies. 90
F. The Illusion of Safe Harbors
The discussion of secondary liability resulted in a "mistaken" sense
of "safe harbor." Section 107(c) specifically notes liability is premised
on "knowing" and that the safe harbor provision relates solely to
inferences from the use of the technology.9' The courts in Napster and
Aimster both focused on actual behavior and intentional inducement
consistent with this interpretation of the safe harbor provision as applied
in the articulation of the Staple Articles of Commerce.92 If there were
any latent ambiguity that the statutory provision for "Staple Article of
Commerce" provided protection against intentional acts of inducement
that resulted in actual infringement it was unequivocally resolved by the
89. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (West 2009). Consider the P2P cases and think of what might have
happened to Google, the search engine, and eBay if the more recent cases were brought before the
relevant technologies matured and the use was heavily imbued with the public interest.
90. See Fred von Lohmann, Remedying Grokster,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2005/07/remedying-i-grokster-i (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
Don't you hate it when you ask someone a question and, rather than answering it, they
choose to answer a different one? Then you understand the frustration that technology
lawyers feel in the wake of the Supreme Court's opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.
v. Grokster Ltd. The question asked by the parties and dozens of amici was direct and
critically important: when will a technology vendor be held liable for the copyright
infringements committed by third parties with its products? Asked to clarify the reach of
copyright law's existing secondary liability doctrines, however, the Court instead
announced a new doctrine for copyright: inducement.
The Court's ruling leaves technology companies and their attorneys to pick their way
through a dangerous minefield of legal uncertainties. The trouble is not principally with
the new doctrine of inducement announced by the Court: "one who distributes a device
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties." Rather, the trouble is the continued uncertainty
surrounding the traditional copyright doctrines of contributory infringement and
vicarious liability. In other words, it's not so much what the Court said, as what it didn't
say, that ought to worry innovators and their attorneys. Id.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2009).
92. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003).
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Grokster Court.93 The detail necessary to meet the standards of proof
regarding the specific behavior required for a finding of contributory
secondary liability was set to rest on remand in the trial of the remaining
defendant Streamcast.
94
The legacy of Sony continues despite resolution of the ambiguity of
safe harbor in Grokster.95 There remain other lingering issues smoldering
in the background. The potential negative inference based on actual
infringing usage still casts a large shadow over technology development.
The lack of transparency has not helped ameliorate the problem. The
resolution of inference-based issues of this nature requires a
commitment to fact finding proceedings in the court based on mature
technology analysis. These should be conducted with due respect for
limitations that inhere in the adversarial process. Recent cases in
addressing technologies essential to the information structures of
intellectual and commercial function reflect the benefit of maturing
paradigms of assessment in weighting private and public values of
technology and allocating duties and risks of management and loss to
effectuate balanced and sustainable public policies.96
III. NAPSTER, AIMSTER, AND GROKSTER: THE DIGITAL TRANSITION -
INTENT, INDUCEMENT, FACILITATION OF INFRINGEMENT
This trilogy of cases following Sony opened a new period of digital
secondary liability.97 Each case evidences the common objective of
facilitating and enabling unlawful appropriation of copyrighted
content.98 The cases after Napster also reflect continuing attempts to
alter the behavioral basis identified for contributory liability and shelter
behavior in the assumed safe harbor of Sony. Napster and Aimster built
their distribution model on a direct pipeline of peer to peer (P2P) file
93. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 (2005).
94. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F.Supp. 2d 1197, 1228 (C.D.
Cal. 2007).
95. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-937.
96. See generally, Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Perfect 10 v.
Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Tiffany & Co. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d
463, 2008 WL 2755787 (S.D.N.Y.), 2008-1, and the decision of the court on remand to allow an
amended complaint in Perfect 10 v. Google, not reported F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 4217837 ( U.S.D.C.
C.D Cal. 2008).
97. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
98. Id.
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sharing involving a central server they operated and controlled.99 In
neither case was copyrighted content on their computers.100 By using
software they provided, they enabled infringers to locate copyrighted
music files on the computers of other users of the system.' 01 This was
accomplished with an index and links provided by Napster.'0 2 Aimster
attempted to cover their knowledge of specific content linked by their
server by encryption technologies that prevented their knowing the name
of the file accessed. 10 3  Grokster's model tried to remove the central
server as the element of control in the equation. 1°4 Though different in
implementation, the common elements in the three cases lie in the role
of P2P file sharing, the fact that actual files were stored on participating
user computers and not a central server, and the use of software provided
by the enabler to enroll, offer for access, find, and download copyrighted
content.105 Grokster's model was advertised and intended to attract prior
users of Napster using further advancements in P2P file sharing that
avoided central indices by querying all computers running their software
online and then downloading packets from multiple computers
simultaneously to form a complete file. 10 6  At no point did any
copyrighted material pass through Grokster's server.
10 7
A. Napster
Napster was one of the early actions addressing digital copy
technologies after Sony.108 Napster was a server centric means of file
sharing that represented an early form of peer to peer file sharing
(P2P).109 Napster played an active, as well as central role throughout the
infringement process." 0
99. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affid in




102. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 901.
103. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646-47.
104. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 (2005).
105. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affid in
part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th
Cir. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
106. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 925.
107. Id. at 920.
108. NA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
109. Id. at 902.
110. Id. at 1012.
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Napster believed it had insulated itself from infringement liability
because the music files themselves were never stored on their servers."'
It was clear, however, that Napster knew they provided links that were
used for downloading of copyrighted materials." 2 Contributory liability
was based on: (1) Napster's operation to act as the central point of
communication between those searching and those opening their
computers to permit the downloading of files and (2) their knowledge,
intention of infringing, marketing of their product for that purpose, and
facilitation of actual file copying."l
3
The court did not engage in any inference from the P2P technology
itself. 'n 4 Despite the fact that inferences regarding non-infringing usage
were thought necessary by the defendant, the court repeatedly indicated
that actual use demonstrated the overwhelming purpose of
infringement. 15 Regardless of the quantitative determination, liability
was premised on evidence of Napster's behavior, intent to provide
access to copyrighted files, and its ability to control access to the content
on its server.'
6
It was this very element of Napster's control over its servers and
interface with its users that distinguished their actions from Sony. Sony
sold a product and had no further relationship with the individual user
beyond equipment warranty.' Napster provided full service to their
registered users, which included software, assistance in use, registration,
and access to Napster's computer to upload and index available content
for downloading."l 8 In addition they provided the location, access, and
means of downloading files by listing the IP address of the host
computer that had files available for copying." 19 Napster maintained the
ability to deny a user access, limit its hours of operations, audit its
content and, in all respects, control hardware and uses. 120 It was the
111. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014
112. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 904.
113. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
114. NA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (2000), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
115. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 911.
116. Id at 927.
117. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
118. Napster, 239 F.Supp.2d. at 901-02.
119. Id
120. Id. at 916-17.
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element of their central role, as observed in later cases, that constituted
the basis of their liability.
121
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Napster's defense and held that
while there may be non-infringing uses, they were contributorally liable
for what amounted to intentional inducement and facilitation of
infringement.122  Their entire business model was one of intentional
inducement of infringement and their use of technology could not
therefore be considered a "Staple Article of Commerce."' 123 The court
understood that the liability of individual infringers was a separate issue
from the function of secondary liability in protecting the rights of the
copyright holder by assuring prophylactic and compensatory relief.
124
B. Aimster: Intent, Inducement, and Facilitation: Avoidance Schemes
Judge Posner characterized Aimster as just another participant in
the developing business of satisfying demand in what can only be called
the burgeoning practice of file swapping.1 25 He indicated that "Aimster
is one of a number of enterprises (the former Napster is the best known)
that have been sued for facilitating the swapping of digital copies of
popular music, most of it copyrighted, over the Internet.' ' 126 Justice
Posner identifies a number of reasons behind the growth and practice of
file swapping. 12' He starts off by noting normative factors that affect
individual choices and behavior. 28  Choices, he says, that impose
burdens on the legal system. 129 These include individual infringers who
are ignorant, ill informed, "discount the likelihood of being sued," are
"disdainful of copyright," or simply have a belief in fairness violated or
simply changing normative values.
130
121. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2004, overruled on other grounds) ("T]he software at issue in Napster . . . employed a
centralized set of servers that maintained an index of available files.... We agreed that Napster
provides the site and facilities for direct infringement." Id); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Because Napster knew of the availability of infringing music
files, assisted users in accessing such files, and failed to block access to such files, we concluded
that Napster materially contributed to infringement." 1d). Napster's defense was that their services
were simply a product much in the mode of Sony. Napster, 239 F.Supp.2d at 916-17.
122. Id. at 921.
123. Id. at 912.
124. See generally, id.
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Secondary liability extends to those who facilitate infringement.13 '
While they are not direct infringers themselves, they can be held liable
for their role as aiders and abettors.'32  Aimster's system is clearly
designed to enable infringement. 33 It provides preparatory software and
a server that can be accessed by other computer users over the
internet.1 34 The server contains information permitting the identification
of sites with copyrighted content that can be downloaded. 135 Aimster's
servers do not contain copies of the infringing files.
36
The behavior of the parties is paramount relative to a determination
of liability. 37 The behavior includes, among other actions, (1) software
and instructions on how to use it, (2) maintenance of a server with file
locations for downloading, (3) control and the right to control the
content on its server, (4) knowledge of actual infringements, and (5)
evidence indicating a business model and intent to infringe.13
8
Two issues in Aimster were critical to the outcome. 39  First, the
court indicated that encryption of the names of songs on the server did
not constitute an appropriate method for avoiding knowledge of specific
instances of infringement.' 40 Second, it found that the file sharing
system could have been used for "innocuous" purposes that were not
131. Id. at 645-46.
132. Id. ("Recognizing the impracticability or futility of a copyright owner's suing a multitude
of individual infringers . . . the law allows a copyright holder to sue a contributor to the
infringement instead, in effect as an aider and abettor." Id.)
After years of suing thousands of people for allegedly stealing music via the Internet, the
recording industry is set to drop its legal assault as it searches for more effective ways to
combat online music piracy .... Instead, the Recording Industry Association of America
said it plans to try an approach that relies on the cooperation of Internet-service
providers.
Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, Dec. 19, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html?mod=rsswhats-newstechnology.
This may well indicate that secondary liability is not the long range answer to deal with the
problem, nor dealing with the burden of specific infringement requirements and allocation of duties
between the parties noted in the Perfect 10 cases against Google, Amazon.corn, and Visa infra
Section IV.





138. See id. at 646-47.
139. Id. at 649-50.
140. Id. They turned a blind eye equivalent to intent (encrypted so they didn't know what was
being downloaded). Willful blindness is knowledge in copyright law (where indeed it may be
enough that the defendant should have known of the direct infringement). In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
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infringing,, the likely objective of this distinction being that liability was
premised on purposeful use, not simply the power of the technology to
infringe. 141 Posner cited the system used by AOL for instant messaging
as an example of a non-infringing use.142 At the same time, however,
the system permitted users the opportunity to distribute copyrighted
materials by others which is exactly what Aimster did to "piggyback" its
file sharing.1 43 This use, without either the knowledge or consent of
AOL, would not render them a contributory infringer.44 What follows is
a ritualistic recitation of the Staple Articles of Commerce standard "that
the producer of a product that has substantial noninfringing uses is not a
contributory infringer merely because some of the uses actually made of
the product [infringe]' 45 They noted that Sony found the recording of
television programs infringed absent a finding of fair use.46 "How
much more the Court held is the principal issue that divides the parties;
and let us try to resolve it, recognizing of course that the Court must
have the last word." 147
The Court was unwilling to allow copyright holders to
prevent infringement effectuated by means of a new
technology at the price of possibly denying non-infringing
consumers the benefit of the technology. We therefore agree
with Professor Goldstein that the Ninth Circuit erred in A &
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th
Cir.2001), in suggesting that actual knowledge of specific
infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a
facilitator a contributory infringer .... ." 'We also do not buy
Aimster's argument that since the Supreme Court
distinguished... between actual and potential non-infringing
uses, all Aimster has to show in order to escape liability for
contributory infringement is that its file-sharing system could
be used in non-infringing ways . . . Were that the law, the
seller of a product or service used solely to facilitate copyright
infringement, though it was capable in principle of non-









147. Id. at 649
148. Id. at651.
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The court did not base liability on the underlying technology. 149  It
understood the non-infringing potential of the technology. 5 ° It did,
however, use this information to identify the relevant elements of
behavior necessary to create liability based on intent, inducement,
knowledge, and control.
151
Almost as an aside, the court noted that the doctrine of vicarious
liability might have been applied to address the issue of secondary
liability.
15 2
How far the doctrine of vicarious liability extends is
uncertain. It could conceivably have been applied in the Sony
case itself, on the theory that while it was infeasible for the
producers of copyrighted television fare to sue the viewers
who used the fast-forward button on Sony's video recorder to
delete the commercials and thus reduce the copyright holders'
income, Sony could have reduced the likelihood of
infringement, as we noted earlier, by a design change. But the
Court, treating vicarious and contributory infringement
interchangeably . . .held that Sony was not a vicarious
infringer either. By eliminating the encryption feature and
monitoring the use being made of its system, Aimster could
like Sony have limited the amount of infringement. Whether
failure to do so made it a vicarious infringer notwithstanding
the outcome in Sony is academic, however; its ostrich-like
refusal to discover the extent to which its system was being
used to infringe copyright is merely another piece of evidence
that it was a contributory infringer.1
53
The issue is no longer academic. We may be in line to find how far
vicarious liability does extend. On remand in the recent case involving
Perfect 10 v. Google, the lower court granted the plaintiff leave in a
second amended complaint to include a vicarious liability claim based
on Google's acquisition of another corporate entity that had the




152. Id. at 654-55.
153. Id.
154. Perfect 10 v. Google, F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 4217837 (C.D Cal. 2008). The difference
between contributory or vicarious liability is not the issue; the issue is whether there is a duty, and
whether it has been violated by the party sought to be held liable. Thus, one might come to this
resounding conclusion, rules of law aside, characterized as "a rose meets a duck": "What's in a
[3:223
T iE SONY LEGACY
C. Grokster: Composed, Refocused on Behavior - Bon Voyage Safe
Harbor
Grokster was the third part of the post-Sony trilogy that involved
a design to infringe. Grokster used adaptive technology that removed
the central server from the process.155 The following is a relatively
simplistic description from a video attempting to explain the
functional differences in P2P models distinguishing Napster and
Aimster from Grokster:
The traditional way of finding a file or other information on
the web you go to a search engine - type in the criteria and
click search. Your computer sends off that information to the
search engine. The search engine has a huge data base of web
pages. The server then sends the search results back to your
computer telling it which sites on the internet have the data
you are searching for. The server with the index plays an
integral or central role in the process.
In contrast, when you use the search capabilities of a P2P
network when you enter the criteria, the computer asks ten
other computers if they have it, these ten then ask ten more
computers, and each of these continue to ask ten more
computers each if they have it, and so on. If any given
computer has the file it sends back a yes answer. You then
download the file directly from the computer that has
indicated it has the file. No server is involved or comes
between the users and the network. Since one peer directly
accesses the data from the other peer, this is called peer to
peer - or P2P. (This is the Grokster model removing Grokster
from direct control represented by server content and
access.)1
56
One of the more significant aspects of Grokster lies in the much needed
clarification of the role played by the "safe harbor" language of Sony."'
No matter the level of non-infringing use that could qualify the
technology as a Staple Article of Commerce, it does not act as a shield
or "safe harbor" against intentional inducement and behavior that
name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." Romeo and Juliet 2.1-
2. Likewise "if it walks like a duck and looks like a duck then it must be a duck."
155. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005).
156. See Posting of Video to http://www.businessweek.com/commonssi/ tcspecial/
peertopeerdiagram.htm (August 1, 2001).
157. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934.
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constitutes the basis for contributory or vicarious liability. 58  Grokster
does little further to clarify when and under what circumstances the
"Staple of Commerce" concept continues to provide a safe harbor and, at
best, appears only to factor in its calculation a snapshot of current usage
of technology. 59  This short term focus obscures underlying issues
affecting normal technology transfer, readiness, and market assessments
which identify ripeness for non-infringing market acceptance and use, as
well as the potential for growth of new markets and usage. Despite
references to Sony as protecting future development, Grokster leaves the
burden of proof of non-infringing uses on the manufacturer or developer
and neither provides a vehicle to take into account or inform of future
uses by characterizing much of the amicus claim of non-infringing use
as anecdotal.
160
D. StreamCast on Remand. An Exercise in Comprehensive Litigation
After remand to the district court for retrial, there was an anxious
time waiting to see whether there would be any defendants left to go to
trial to further understand the ruling of the court.' 61 StreamCast and
Sharman Networks remained as the only defendants in the case that had
not settled prior to trial.
162
The subsequent trial of Streamcast was a model of discovery. 163
The evidence collected highlighted organization, incrimination, and
proof of intent. 164 It also focused on the business model, advertisements,
help to customer-users, knowledge, refusal to implement known filters
because it would work and diminish their business model and many
more elements found by emails, telephone calls, letters and testimony of
witnesses. 165  It is this model which provides the template and
158. Id.
159. Seeid.
160. Supra note 90.
161. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F.Supp.2d 966 (C.D. Cal.
2006)
162. Id. Grokster and related parties settled in November 2005, agreeing to a permanent
injunction and payment of $50 million. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Case No.
01-08541 SVW (FMOx), (C.D.Cal. Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.svmedialaw.com/
Grokster%20settlement.pdf. The settlement covered Grokster Ltd., Swaptor, Ltd., Daniel B. Rung,
Matthew A. Rung, and Michael Rung as defendants. Id. The $50 million is to be reduced by any
judgment against the Grokster Parties in Leiber, et al. v Consumer Empowerment, Case No. CV 01-
09923 SVW. Id.





foundation of present judicial structure in prosecuting issues of
secondary liability for infringement.
166
IV. POST-GRoKSTER: PERFECT 10 TO TIFFANY:
EXTERNALIZING RISK AND SEARCHING FOR DEEP POCKETS
The post-Grokster focus on secondary liability was not on
inference, nor on dealing with the remnants of the "Staple Article of
Commerce" issues. Post-Grokster cases have dealt with enabling
technologies that have matured to serve clear public functions.'6 7 The
courts have been faced with maturing technologies that deal with issues
of risk allocation, of externalizing costs of diligence, of the duties of the
respective parties, including the right holder, and of standards of care
and Reasonable Alternative Design (RAD).168 The cases methodically
move from consideration of the required finding of direct infringement
to secondary liability issues of intent, inducement, and contributory
behavior. They introduce issues of liability by reflecting on the broader
purpose and usage of technologies that have both infringing and non-
infringing applications. 169 They attempt to balance the interests of the
content right holder, the innovator of the enabling technology and the
public interest. 70 This represents more than a subtle change in focus
from a concern with property rights to a perspective of balance and the
beneficial use of technologies that can also be used to infringe.'
71
The cases also contend with changing business models that attempt
to use the judicial system to externalize risks and costs associated with
business practices. They also have had to deal with issues of attempts to
maximize returns by resorting to litigation for infringement as
compensatory and enriching by statutory damages using injunctive
remedies or threats of injunction to secure settlement or licensing fees in
excess of fair market value. 1
72
These cases demonstrate the inherent quality of the judicial process
to adapt in time by continuing to take into account the potential of
166. Id.
167. See Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Perfect 10 v. Google,
F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 4217837 (C.D Cal. 2008); Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788






172. See generally Gordon, supra note 45, at 1609; eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97.
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innovative technologies in the measure of protections to be accorded
"property rights." 173
A. Perfect 10 v. Google (Amazon)
Perfect 10 brought a series of actions against multiple parties for
infringement of their copyrights. 74 In the action against Google and
Amazon, they alleged primary infringement of their copyrighted images
in the very function of search engine technology and secondary liability
for facilitating third party infringement. 175 In a separate action against
Visa they alleged secondary liability for facilitating the purchase of their
copyrighted images and the failure to monitor purchases for infringing
purposes. 1 6 The composite of these distinct actions is a "reasoned"
attempt by the court to identify the basis for secondary liability, establish
standards of behavior and relative duties of both the content holder and
the alleged defendant, and provide transparency in the balance of
potential contributory liability. 77  The courts in both cases had the
benefit of considering mature technologies and business function that
displayed their-prowess and beneficial function. 178 In both cases, there
was a potential for both infringing and non-infringing activity. 179  In
both cases the maturity of the technologies forestalled speculation on
intention to use for infringing purposes. 180 This still leaves the teasing
question of what might have happened if, as with P2P, the technology in
question had been adopted by early users for infringement purposes?
How would this have been weighted against an unknown future?
The plaintiff, Perfect 10 ". . . publishes the adult magazine
PERFECT 10" and operates the subscription website, "perfect l0.com,"
both of which feature high-quality, nude photographs of "natural"
models.' 8' They had considerable investment in these images and
derived income from both the hard copy publication and fees charged for
173. Supra note 167.
174. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 4217837 (C.D Cal. 2008); and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n.,
494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
175. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 2008 WL 4217837 (C.D Cal. 2008).
176. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).




181. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2007).
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access to their web site.18 2 The copyright infringer copied the images
from Perfect 10 without license, posted them, and maintained them on a
computer that could be accessed over the internet. 183 Perfect 10 brought
this action against Google for direct infringement of its copyrighted
images by thumbnails maintained on its server and display of full
resolution images on its web pages through framing images located on
third party servers.' 84 Google was also sued for secondary liability
based on the use of Google's search engine to facilitate finding images,
some of which included images belonging to Perfect 10 that had been
misappropriated and posted by direct infringers.18 5 The function of the
search engine was not intended to induce or facilitate infringement,
although it could be used inappropriately for both purposes.1
8 6
The direct infringement issue appears one of reconciling the
function of the search engine with "incidental" use of protected
images.18 7  There is a similarity between the search engine and the
Betamax as both play a role in enabling the copying of protected
materials.' 8 Liability for infringement in both cases depends on "fair
use" issues that affect primary and secondary liability questions. 89 As
noted in Sony and revealed in the papers of the Justices, the Betamax
resolution of these issues bears directly on the manner by which these
issues are identified in terms of present use and future potential, present
economic value, and beneficial use both present and future.190 How this
comparison is structured affects characterization of the use for
infringement purposes as primary or incidental and outside the core
business model or intent of the provider.
Judge Matz structures the comparison by introducing the case with
this "flavor:"
The principal two-part issue in this case arises out of the
increasingly recurring conflict between intellectual property
rights on the one hand and the dazzling capacity of internet
technology to assemble, organize, store, access, and display
intellectual property "content" on the other hand. That issue,
182. Id. at 832.
183. Id. at 832-34.
184. Id. at 834.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 832.
187. Id at 845-47.
188. Id.
189. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419-20 (1984);
supra note 174.
190. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,419-20 (1984)..
2009] DIE SONY LEGACY 251
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
in a nutshell, is: does a search engine infringe copyrighted
images when it displays them on an "image search" function
in the form of "thumbnails" but not infringe when, through in-
line linking, it displays copyrighted images served by another
website? 191
Note the respect accorded the core functions of the internet and the
search engine and the implicit appreciation of the inherent role they
serve an information-based global society.' 92  The district court found
that the thumbnails were infringing. 193 The district court found that the
in-line linking of the images from the direct infringer's server was not a
"display" because the images were not stored on or shown from their
web page, but simply linked through HTML instructions to the server
with the images, which then caused them to appear on the screen. 94
On appeal, the court reviewed the infringement claims regarding
the thumbnails stored on the Google server and ruled that while this did
constitute an infringement, they were "fair use." 195 The images were not
used for the purpose of displaying the image, but for the necessary
purposes of a search engine.' 96  The copying was therefore
transformative in use ("function") and therefore "fair use."'197 To hold
otherwise would have seriously impaired the functionality of the search
engine. 198  The court applied what is now called the "server test"
harkening us back to Napster and Aimster.199 They affirmed the finding
of the district court that the display, by framing, might mislead some
viewers into thinking that the images were on Google's web page, but
that for purposes of the display right under the copyright statute, the
191. Google, 416 F.Supp.2d at 831.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 844.
194. Id.
195. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). The court
considered the direct infringement claims of Perfect 10. Id. at 1159. This has become a template-
based approach to analyzing these complex relationships. "Plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements
to present a prima facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must show ownership of the allegedly
infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one
exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106." Id. Even if a plaintiff satisfies
these two requirements and makes a prima facie case of direct infringement, the defendant may
avoid liability if it can establish that its use of the images is a "fair use" as set forth in 17 U.S.C. §
107. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003).
196. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1166-67.
197. Id.
198. Id. The court engaged in an extended description of the function of the internet and




function of the internet described in the quotation indicates Google is not
a direct infringer:
2°°
Instead of communicating a copy of the image, Google
provides HTML instructions that direct a user's browser to a
website publisher's computer that stores the full-size
photographic image. Providing these HTML instructions is
not equivalent to showing a copy. First, the HTML
instructions are lines of text, not a photographic image.
Second, HTML instructions do not themselves cause
infringing images to appear on the user's computer screen.
The HTML merely gives the address of the image to the
user's browser. The browser then interacts with the computer
that stores the infringing image. It is this interaction that
causes an infringing image to appear on the user's computer
screen.
20 1
There are innumerable instances in law where the distinction
between "form and substance" is important. The question this analysis
raises is why in this case form prevails over what may otherwise
constitute substance? The substance of the right to display lies in the
viewing of the image, which this technology in fact accomplishes.
Should it make any difference in a determination of whether a display
right is infringed where the image is located? The substance of the right
is control over display, which is, in fact, what the HTML instructions
accomplish regardless of whether the image is on the Google server or a
third party infringer server. These distinctions raise questions regarding
implications that may bear on further analysis of secondary liability
issues.
The court's analysis of secondary liability issues continues in this
awareness of the "dazzling" function of Google's search engine.202 To
have secondary liability, the court looked for a direct infringer, not the
party that initially misappropriated them from Perfect 10, but
infringement by a user of the search engine that cached an image on the
computer hard drive during internet access.20 3 It then applied prior fair
use analysis to factors similar to that it used on the issue of primary
liability regarding Google. 204 The court indicated that even if users of
Google's search engine cached an image, it would be fair use just as it
200. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Anazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1169-72.
203. Id. at 1169-70.
204. Seeid. at ll70.
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was for Google. °5 Google neither induced, nor encouraged infringement
of Perfect 10's images.206 The product Google distributes has
207commercially significant non-infringing uses. Contributory liability
requires intent.20 8 That intent can be imputed through tort law which
"ordinarily imputes to an action the intention to cause the natural and
probable consequences of his conduct."209 It is interesting that the court
first sets this forth as a common law rule, then a rule in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 8A, and only later does it address the Staple Article
of Commerce provision from the Patent Act.210  All of these appear
basically of the same import: "one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer."211  The court concludes that even if Google had actual
knowledge that there was some infringing material, its conduct did not
materially contribute; it did not promote or encourage users to visit the
infringing web sites.212
The lower court did not address either the form of notice Google
213was given, or its response. It is reasonable to assume that Google was
aware that a collateral consequence of a search conducted by its search
engine would include copyrighted content, which would then be indexed
for use by a potential infringer. While they have knowledge that their
search engine will include infringing images among the millions of non-
infringing images, they will have no details of the specifics of which
images are copyrighted and which images are infringements.214 The
search engine crawls the web and indexes any materials it finds, unless
the holder chooses to "opt out," or provides specific notice that its
materials are being infringed.215 Google can prevent illegally posted
images from being accessed, provided it has notice of which images and
where they are located.216 This requires actual notice of specific images
205. Id. at 1169-70.
206. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Anazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007).
207. Id.
208. Id. at l71.
209. Id.
210. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.con, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 175.
214. Amazon.com,508 F.3d at 1155.
215. Supra note 197.
216. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1175.
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so that Google can respond, as it does when noticed, in an appropriate
manner.
2 17
What obligation does Google have to identify images which are
copyrighted and improperly posted on the internet? We can assume it is
not strict liability since that would be devastating to the function of the
internet and search engine technologies. It is also one thing to premise
liability on wrongful intent and actions, but this is distinctly based on the
failure to act to protect another's lawful interests and sounds as a duty,
an obligation not to harm, much the same as negligence in tort law. It
poses an intellectual property "slip and fall," awareness of the potential
for slippery conditions versus actual knowledge of a specific condition
in need of attention.21 8 It also poses issues of what is reasonable under
the circumstances in terms of vigilance or RAD on the part of the
technology provider. Filters have become somewhat common with
some file structures to prevent infringement, but in the context of digital
imaging it becomes particularly problematic and burdensome. The filter
must have specific images claimed to be copyrighted and the capacity to
store them on a server in order to make a match.21 9 Not only is this a
liability question, but is an indicator of the vigilance required by the
owner of the right to monitor infringement, to give specific notice to
permit protection of its rights and the opportunity of the search engine
provider to prevent linking.220 The risk of infringement should not be
permitted to be externalized, nor should the cost of vigilance. Further,
while hard copy images can be unlawfully digitalized and posted on the
internet, the choice of form of publication by Perfect 10 on their internet
web site increased the likelihood of misappropriation.22' In addressing
liability, the duties of both parties should be considered as to their
comparative responsibility for the infringement and positioning to avoid
unintended consequences.
An unanticipated issue was brought to the attention of the court on
the question of whether Google could be held vicariously liable because
of the direct infringement by a third party that displayed and distributed
217. Id.
218. It presents the temptation of those that would slip and fall to enrich themselves. See Field,
412 F.Supp.2d at 1115. That question might arise in this case with the motive and business model
of Perfect 10 and whether they are misusing the legal process.
219. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp. 2d 828, 858 (C.D.Cal. 2006) (overruled
on other grounds).
220. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F.Supp. 2d 1197, 1237
(C.D.Cal. 2007) (discussing the Napster notice requirement).
221. Perfect 10, 416 F.Supp. 2d at 832 (overruled on other grounds) (permitting users to copy
and download images to their cellphones).
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the image.222 The court initially indicated there was no proof that
Google had actual knowledge or a right and ability to stop the
infringement.223 In essence, they didn't have the right or ability to stop
third party infringers. On remand, however, the court was presented
with evidence in the motion for a second amended complaint that
Google had acquired a web business that hosted blogs: "it operates a
weblog hosting service ("Blogger") at www.Blogger.com and
Blogspot.com. Blogger.com is where bloggers create, edit, and
administer their blogs, while Blogspot.com is where blogs are actually
hosted., 224 Perfect 10 alleged that full size images appeared on these
servers by demonstrating that their copyrighted material was indexed,
referenced, and stored on a computer controlled by Google.225 Perfect
10 contends that this renders Google subject to contributory liability for
images it has control over its server.226 This presents a new twist in
liability and business relationships. It presents a problem where there
are vertical and horizontal amalgamations of closely and distantly
related web-based enterprises. It can create new levels of care and
potential liability that will have to be addressed for secondary liability
implications. It certainly could alter the characterization of the court that
Google lacked the ability to police because, in this instance, it may be
ruled their own server.
B. Perfect 10 v. Visa227
Perfect 10 brought an action for infringement of its copyright
pictures against financial institutions "that process . . . credit card
payment to alleged infringing web sites. 228  They did not bring an
action against the direct infringers.229 Perfect 10 claimed to have given
defendant Visa and Mastercard entities notices "specifically identifying
both the websites and that the payments were for the purchase of
infringing images., 230  The credit card companies charge for their
222. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1172-75 (discussing vicarious infringement).
223. Id. at H175.
224. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 4217837, *3 (C.D.Cal. 2008).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).





services. At no time did the credit card agencies proceed in response to
the notices.23'
The court set the context in which Perfect 10's claims were to be
viewed:
[W]ith an awareness that credit cards serve as the primary
engine of electronic commerce and that Congress has
determined it to be the "policy of the United States-(l) to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media
[and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1).
232
With this preamble, the court set forth a series of observations about
secondary liability that both synthesize and expand upon the rules to this
point. The foundation for secondary liability lies in tort law "concepts
of enterprise liability and imputed intent. 233  There are a number of
different variations on the articulation of the test, but they all include (1)
knowledge of third party infringement, and (2) the defendant "induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct., 234 They then
go on to say that when the Supreme Court cited from the Patent Act,
they adopted the concept of inducement as "intentionally inducing or
encouraging direct infringement., 235 And, of immediate relevance, in
the case brought by Perfect 10 against Google and Amazon, "we found
that "an actor may be contributorily liable . . . for intentionally
encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that
are substantially certain to result in such direct infringement., 236 This
recitation leads to the following synthesized statement of the rule as
applied in this case:
We understand these several criteria to be non-contradictory
variations on the same basic test, i.e., that one contributorily
infringes when he (1) has knowledge of another's
231. Id.
232. Id. at 794.
233. Id. at 795.
234. Id. (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004)).
235. See id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930
(2005)).
236. Id. This omits the further notation that Justice Ginsburg used yet another standard in the
failure to meet the test of Staple Article of Commerce, one which was neither claimed nor used in
this case.
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infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b)
induces that infringement. Viewed in isolation, the language
of the tests described is quite broad, but when one reviews the
details of the actual "cases and controversies" ... in each of
the test-defining cases and the actual holdings in those cases,
it is clear that the factual circumstances in this case are not
analogous. To find that Defendants' activities fall within the
scope of such tests would require a radical and inappropriate
expansion of existing principles of secondary liability and
would violate the public policy of the United States."'
In this case the credit card companies do not contribute to the
infringement. 23 8  There is no connection to locating, downloading,
displaying, or distributing the images. 239 They have no connection with
the infringer other than in the ordinary course of their business of
honoring credit card transactions. 240 As compared to Perfect 10 v.
Google, it must be borne in mind that the Google search engine
contributed to finding and downloading of the copyrighted works.24 '
The payment using Visa credit cards is not the equivalent, but is
extraneous to and independent of the infringement process.242
Perfect 10 also claimed that Visa was vicariously liable for the
copyright infringement.2 43 In light of the fact that this issue was raised
in the Perfect 10 v. Google remand and will be pursued further, the
court's statement of the basis to sustain a vicarious copyright claim is
helpful. The court stated: "[t]o state a claim for vicarious copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has (1) the right
and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial
interest in the infringing activity.
' 244
The court ". . . decline[d] to create any of the radical new theories
of liability advocated by Perfect 10 . . . [and] aftirm[ed] the district
court's dismissal with prejudice of all causes of action in Perfect 10's
237. Id.
238. Id. at 796.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Supra note 175.
242. Supra note 228.
243. Visa, 494 F.3d at 802.
244. Id. The court went on to note that "[t]he Supreme Court has recently offered (in dictum)
an alternate formulation of the test: 'One . . . infringes vicariously by profiting from direct
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it."'Id.
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complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 245
C. Tiffany V. eBay1
46
Tiffany is an old and reputable retailer of jewelry and accessories
that are coveted for their design and symbolic status. 47 eBay is an
online marketplace where third party sellers list their wares, and buyers
view, bid, and purchase products directly from the vendors.248 eBay
never possesses or gives an opinion on the product or the reputation or
veracity of the seller.249 Its primary function is to provide a means for
sellers and buyers to connect and consummate a transaction.250 eBay
may have as many as six million new listings per day.
251
The premise of Tiffany's action is that between 2003 and 2006
hundreds of thousands of fraudulent and counterfeit Tiffany goods were
sold on eBay and that the sale of these goods resulted in direct and
secondary trademark infringement as well as trademark dilution and
other claims of harm.252 Tiffany contends that eBay is generally aware
that counterfeit goods are being sold and has been made specifically
aware and has done nothing to monitor its sellers or control the sales of
infringing goods by preemptively refusing to accept listings or removing
sellers they suspect of infringing product.253 eBay has removed listings
and barred sellers when given specific notice by Tiffany of an infringing
listing.254 Tiffany also acknowledges that the infringers are the sellers,
not eBay.255 Secondary liability is based on facilitating with knowledge
that counterfeits are being sold.256
The court goes to the heart of the issue when it restates the
controversy as one which both eBay and Tiffany share: removing
counterfeit Tiffany merchandise from eBay's web site.257 eBay needs to
245. Id. at 810.
246. Tiffany & Co., v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 2008 WL 2755787 (S.D.N.Y.).
247. Id at 472.
248. Id. at 474.
249. Id. at 475.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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protect its business reputation and business model.258 Tiffany needs to
protect its trademark and reputation for quality goods which are
damaged when inferior products are sold with their name.259  To
Tiffany's attempt to externalize the risks of doing business and the cost
of monitoring to protect its rights, the court noted: "the heart of this
dispute is not whether counterfeit Tiffany jewelry should flourish on
eBay, but rather, who should bear the burden of policing Tiffany's
valuable trademarks in Internet commerce. 26 °
The burden of policing is different than the burden of responding
when put on notice of counterfeit goods. Many, if not most goods
bearing Tiffany's name on eBay were genuine objects put up for
resale.2 6' eBay was however, aware that counterfeit goods were often
posted for sale.262 When specific notice of this was brought to their
attention, they acted with reasonable dispatch, removed the listing, and
prohibited the seller from further listings.263 Does having notice that
there are ongoing listings of counterfeit goods render eBay liable for
infringement? The court held that this alone does not render eBay liable
because ". . . the standard is not whether eBay could reasonably
anticipate possible infringement, but rather whether eBay continued to
supply its services to sellers when it knew or had reason to know of
infringement by those sellers.,,264  Does having general notice of
infringing activity render eBay liable to monitor for infringement, and
remove those items it believes infringe, before the listings are posted?
The court again set out a clear rule respecting the function of internet
business ventures:
The law does not impose liability for contributory trademark
infringement on eBay for its refusal to take such preemptive
steps in light of eBay's "reasonable anticipation" or
generalized knowledge that counterfeit goods might be sold
on its website. Quite simply, the law demands more specific
knowledge as to which items are infringing and which seller











Who has the responsibility and bears the cost and burden of monitoring
for specific instances of infringement? The court again refused to allow
these duties to be externalized:
Tiffany must ultimately bear the burden of protecting its
trademark. Policymakers may yet decide that the law as it
stands is inadequate to protect rights owners in light of the
increasing scope of Internet commerce and the concomitant
rise in potential trademark infringement. Nevertheless, under
the law as it currently stands, it does not matter whether eBay
or Tiffany could more efficiently bear the burden of policing
the eBay website for Tiffany counterfeits-an open question
left unresolved by this trial. Instead, the issue is whether
eBay continued to provide its website to sellers when eBay
knew or had reason to know that those sellers were using the
website to traffic in counterfeit Tiffany jewelry. The Court
finds that when eBay possessed the requisite knowledge, it
took appropriate steps to remove listings and suspend service.
Under these circumstances, the Court declines to impose
liability for contributory trademark infringement.
266
With this ruling comes the potential of shaping the prerequisites to
secondary liability in the future that takes into account the inherent
responsibilities and duties of the parties. The court noted that while they
were "sympathetic to Tiffany's frustrations . . . the fact remains that
right holders bear the principal responsibility to police their own
trademarks., 267 Tiffany v. eBay268 has added a dimension that may help
in instances requiring specificity of knowledge and notice by
considering the relative burden on each of the parties to ferret out
infringers. 269 Thus, the court indicated that because eBay had legitimate
sellers in their business model of authentic Tiffany products, the burden
on eBay was disproportionate to the duty Tiffany would bear if it
monitored eBay web sales for counterfeits or trademark infringement
and notified eBay of the infraction. 270  Each time eBay was given
specific notice; it responded and removed the product and or the
seller.271  The court imposed a duty on the owner to exercise care and
266. Id.
267. ld. at471.
268. Tiffany & Co. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 2008 WL 2755787 (S.D.N.Y.).
269. Id. at 469.
270. Id. at 517.
271. Id. at469.
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give notice in a manner similar to comparative responsibility under
general rules of tort.272
V. THE FUTURE OF SECONDARY LIABILITY
In the two-and-a-half decades since Sony, the rules have changed,
albeit subtly at times, reflecting the courts' experience in addressing
constantly changing technologies and public interests. While the
primary basis for secondary liability is intent coupled with behavior to
induce and facilitate infringement, there remain some issues relating to
inferences derived from actual uses that infringe.
Technologies and business methods that have been widely adopted
are no longer treated as suspect simply because they can be used for
infringement. The resort to inferences from improper use tainting
technology still appears as lurking in the background, rather than as
directly applicable to the conflict before the court. The courts appear
increasingly adept at highlighting the legitimate functions of technology
in the context of protecting vested rights of the property holder. While
the "Staple Article of Commerce" characterization continues to be noted,
its use as a probative factor has been minimized by rapid assimilation of
new technologies and business methods into the mainstream. Who
would question that eBay, or Amazon, or Google and the multiple of
other internet and information technologies are not staples in commerce?
Some early concerns that the valuation of intellectual property
rights would inhibit balanced consideration of nascent technologies and
future uses have abated. There are legitimate issues, however, regarding
the lack of transparency and objective methodologies for assessment of
innovation and technology transfers. The adversarial process has
limitations when decisive issues may not be represented by the parties
before the court.
The measure of technology in early cases was but a snapshot in
time. In application of the Staple Articles of Commerce equation, the
burden of proof regarding existing non-infringing uses is on the
272. The rapid development of the Internet and websites like eBay have created new ways for
sellers and buyers to connect to each other and to expand their businesses beyond geographical
limits. These new markets have also, however, given counterfeiters new opportunities to expand
their reach. The Court is not unsympathetic to Tiffany and other rights owners who have invested
enormous resources in developing their brands, only to see them illicitly and efficiently exploited by
others on the Internet. Nevertheless, the law is clear: it is the trademark owner's burden to police its
mark, and companies like eBay cannot be held liable for trademark infringement based solely on
their generalized knowledge that trademark infringement might be occurring on their websites. Id. at
527.
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defendant.273 There are a few instances where potential is verbalized as
the objective and in an adversarial context anecdotal declarations have
not been accorded significant probative value. Consider the following
from Perfect 10 v. Visa:
In sum, where an article is good for nothing else but
infringement, there is no legitimate public interest in its
unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming
or imputing intent to infringe. Conversely, the doctrine
absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item with
substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability
to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding
that some of one's products will be misused. It leaves
274breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce.
Does it really matter how many times you read this quotation in
searching for how judgments are to be made, where the evidence comes
from and how that evidence is evaluated? Is there any indication of
when in time the determination of "non infringing uses" is made? What
validity attaches to present use, without an understanding of how
technologies develop and how they are adopted in the market place?
Does the Staple Article of Commerce address these issues? So where is
the "breathing room for innovation . . .?" Basic application of tort
doctrine asking for proof of present or future uses should seek to be
informed from disciplines designed specifically to tell about different
models, paths, and paces of development and the conclusions that can be
drawn from facts and factors that are available and calculable. 275 What
is needed is a transparent analytical framework that assures objective
facts for an otherwise subjective judgment.
Those engaged in the burgeoning area of technology transfer in the
public and private sectors have templates for evaluation and technology
assessment. Technology readiness assessment is used by industry,
universities, and the military just to note a few areas of application.
What does readiness mean? It includes "market readiness," which seeks
273. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440-42 (1984).
274. Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007).
275. See Ginsburg, supra note 19.
Indeed, though intent to facilitate infringement by enabling end-user copying supposedly
forms the keystone of contributory liability, it is not clear whether Grokster's indicia
identify bad intents or bad results. In many cases it may be possible to show intent to
enable end-user copying, but intent to enable end-user copying that is infringing may end
up being retrospectively assessed based on the volume of infringement that in fact
transpires. Id. at 585.
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to determine whether innovation is in response to an identified user
need, simply designated as "user driven," predicated on a known
demand to adopt the technology. The converse of the "user driven"
model is one where there are few, if any, known uses or users for the
technology or product. This is a "technology driven model," where the
"hope" is that potential users will find the technology and recognize its
utility. User-driven models present little risk and are "market ready."
Real estate investors have long known this as location theory - the right
place, the right time. The classic example of underestimating the
potential market for technology-driven application is that of Xerox and
the Palo Alto Research Park innovation of the Graphic User Interface
design. Xerox failed to appreciate its potential for use and its
application. Those with a vision outside the box realized its potential,
and thus began the Apple Computer saga, the Windows transition, and
contemporary digital interfaces.
Technology transfer assessment methodologies follow proven paths
of disciplined data collection and analysis that assure some semblance of
objectivity in making assessments. The first step used by many to find
whether there is user need is often a "quick" patent search. The level of
Patent Activity is indicative of current user need or demand. Issues of
readiness assessment regarding "demand" are applicable to other aspects
of the technology transfer process, such as supplies, labor, and facilities
in the context of manufacturing capability and capacity. If the readiness
assessment addresses existing technologies, it might be a "technology
transfer readiness assessment" focusing on the transfer of technologies
to other applications as might well have occurred with the development
of the Sony Betamax. These are routine assessments that universities,
investors, the military and other institutions engage in on a regular basis.
These assessments are as much an art as they are a science. While they
have their limitations, there is transparency which is more easily
understood than intuition and in most instances, more likely superior to
relying on the adversarial process to be informed of matters critical to
216the public wellbeing and progress in the arts and sciences.
Readiness assessments should also consider risk assessment
elements. The risk of incalculable liabilities is one factor. The losses
that are occasioned by a product being used for infringement purposes
276. See generally Phyllis L. Speser, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
(John Wiley & Sons) (2006) (discussing Technology Transfer and Assessment). The references in
these paragraphs for use in secondary liability cases are an adaptation of these principles that
emerged in a class co-taught with Professor Speser at the State University of New York School of
Law, Buffalo, during the academic year 2007.
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should be considered for internalization as part of the decision making
process. Decisions that are made under the current process externalize
many of these costs because of incomplete licensing and market
strategies. The R&D factor involved in RAD (reasonable alternative
design) assessment should be disciplined to inform of readiness,
application, and recovery of costs.
"Readiness" lies at the heart of each decision that attempts to give
weight to early adoption as indicative of intent. Early cases used a
snapshot in time that failed to provide a transparent model addressing
distinctions that drive adoption timing, rates, and user groups. The cases
fail to differentiate between user-driven adoption and technologies that
drive uses. It doesn't appear as if current models consider that
inappropriate infringing adoptions may show the way to non-infringing
uses that might not otherwise have been evident. This applies to all
those wonderful potential applications introduced in evidence and touted
in the amicus briefs the court in Grokster dismissed as anecdotal.
Consider this excerpt from Sony on the need for disciplined
consideration of new technologies.
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to
resolve that question, we need not explore all the different
potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the
district court a significant number of them would be non-
infringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need
not give precise content to the question of how much use is
commercially significant.277
We ought not to be put in the position where the unknown prematurely
denies society the benefit of uses yet to come. Each use should be
measured and the technology innovator or distributor held liable only for
the consequences specific to their actions or, in some circumstances,
inaction that do not involve inferences.
These issues were among the residuals of Sony.278 They were at
the boundaries of conventional methodologies for secondary liability.
The discomfort with the unknown and potential loss of intellectual
property value often resulted in pressure to draw preemptive inferences
from the use of technology focusing on "infringement," rather than on
277. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
278. Id. at419-20.
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the potential for achieving greater value by the use of inherent
technologies.
The differences in the later cases involving technologies appear to
be increasing tolerance for future use. Perfect 10 v. Google,
demonstrated the court's ability to deal with a rapidly evolving new
technology based on the internet search engine.279 It wasn't simply that
there were infringing uses and beneficial uses, but that the underlying
technology had matured to the point that, independent of its actual use, it
was deemed "dazzling" by the lower court and important to the
functionality of the internet and public interest. 28° With the preeminent
role digitalization and the internet serve in infringement, copying,
distributing, and displaying, the question is, what has changed? One
might suggest a sense of balance.
There remains, however, a gray area of concern. The courts have
left to future cases a workable and sustainable modeling of technology-
based readiness and market assessment. They have left open the "risk
assessment" that leaves to future cases consideration of necessary and
dependent risk analysis at the heart of innovation. A clear understanding
of the pulse of new technology innovation necessitates the incorporation
of existing assessment frameworks to prevent unwarranted inferences
and "chilling affects" to the detriment of the public.281
How would either the eBay business model or Google's search
engine process have been decided at the inception of their
implementation cycle using the Staple Article of Commerce standard?
Would the potential have been factored into the analysis and ever been
realized?
279. Supra note 174.
280. Id.
281. See Remedying Grokster, supra, note 90. An interesting question after Grokster:
Under Justice Ginsburg's more demanding formulation (which appears to have only 3
votes), BitTorrent might be in trouble. Would Justice Ginsburg go this far? Her opinion
dismissed the evidence of the band Wilco using Grokster ... to distribute Yankee Hotel
Foxtrot as merely anecdotal. (One would think that Yankee Hotel Foxtrot would have
taught people to stop dismissing Wilco, but that's another story.) Would she dismiss
etree so quickly? Yes, BitTorrent is massively used to pirate movies, but the non-
infringing use of BitTorrent is also substantial. It was developed for the jam band
community for legal usage, and continues to foster thriving, well-policed legal usage in
that community. I would hope that if faced with BitTorrent, Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy
and Rehnquist would see one of the messages of today's decision: Technology doesn't
commit infringement; people commit (or induce) infringement.
Mark Schultz, What Happens to BitTorrent After Grokster?, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2005/06/what_happensto.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
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It is thus that the world of innovation and secondary liability keeps
changing. Vested property rights remain in need of protection as does
the future. Recent cases represent a step in the right direction to achieve
balance along the path toward a sustainable future.282
282. But see, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., v. Gary Fung, 447 F.Supp.2d 306 (S.D. New
York 1006). Could this simply be one step forward and two steps back or is this consistent with
focus on behavior to preserve the public benefit of the underlying technology?
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